IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
Pl ai nti ff,)	
-VS-) No.	14-CV-704-GKF-JFJ
OSAGE WIND, LLC, et al.,		
Defendant(s).))	

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY K. FRIZZELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

JULY 15, 2020

REPORTED BY: BRI AN P. NEI L, RMR-CRR Uni ted States Court Reporter

APPEARANCES 1 2 3 Cathryn D. McCl anahan and Nol an Fields, Assistant United States Attorneys, 110 West 7th Street, Suite 300, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74119, attorneys on behalf of the Plaintiff; 4 Charles R. Babst, Jr., Attorney, Department of 5 Interior, 7906 East 33rd Street, Suite 1000, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74145, attorney on behalf of the Plaintiff; 6 7 8 Ryan A. Ray, Attorney at Law, Norman, Wohl gemuth, Chandler, Jeter, Barnett & Ray, 401 South Boston Avenue, Suite 2900, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74103, attorney on behalf of the 9 Defendants: 10 Lynn H. Slade and Sarah Stevenson, Attorneys at Law, 11 Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.O. Box 2168, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87103, attorneys on behalf of the 12 Defendants; 13 14 Wilson Pipestem, Abi Fain, Mary K. Nagle, Attorneys at Law, Pipestem Law, 320 South Boston Avenue, Suite 1705, Tulsa, 15 Oklahoma, 74103, attorneys on behalf of the Intervenor. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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Wednesday, July 15, 2020

DEPUTY COURT CLERK: This is Case No.

14-CV-704-GKF-JFJ, United States of America v. Osage Wind, et al. Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. PIPESTEM: Your Honor, this is Wilson Pipestem from Pipestem Law on behalf of the Osage Minerals Council, and with me is Mary Kathryn Nagle, Abi Fain, and Zoe Latham.

MS. MCCLANAHAN: United States is represented by Catherine McClanahan and Nolan Fields with client Charles Babst also present.

MR. RAY: And good morning, Your Honor. On behalf of all defendants, Ryan Ray, and I have co-counsel on the line with me, Lynn Slade and Sarah Stevenson.

THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. This is judge Frizzell. Let me start off by saying that the gist of the July 1st orders was that we are going to try the claims that are framed by the first amended complaint and to try the remedies sought by the United States in that first amended complaint.

In that regard, the United States alleged in the first amended complaint that defendants knew, or should have known, that they were required to comply with the express provisions of 25 CFR 211 or 25 CFR 214. It was not, and is not, the court's intent to bar discovery and to bar any dispute with

regard to the issue of innocent trespasser versus bad faith trespasser which, in my view, is an issue of the measure of damages for trespass; in other words, whether the defendants, while legally wrongdoers, acted in the honest belief that their conduct was lawful; or on the other hand, whether the defendant acted with culpable negligence or a willful disregard of the rights of others. We will issue a short order clarifying that position later today.

It would appear to me that you all have agreed to the lion's share of what should be pretrial deadlines and let me just get directly to that. You all have agreed to an exchange of preliminary witness and exhibit lists on September 4th of 2020. You've agreed that the plaintiff's expert witness reports are due on September 18th of 2020, that the intervenor's expert reports are due on or before October 2nd of 2020.

With respect to the defendants' reports, I'm going to set that deadline for October 30th of 2020. As for discovery cutoff, it would seem to me that with the real restrictions that have been imposed by COVID that the discovery cutoff should be December 18th of 2020, which would logically kick the date for dispositive motions to January of 2021. My suggestion is, because the first of the year is always kind of a difficult time, we would either set the 15th or the 22nd as a deadline for dispositive motions.

1 Is there any preference there? Mr. Ray? 2 MR. RAY: Your Honor, either would be fine. I think 3 the court's correct, it would probably make sense to have that 4 about 30 days after the close of discovery. I know that's been 5 my experience in other cases. And so we certainly think that 6 would be appropriate but have no particular preference with 7 either one. THE COURT: All right. Well, because we have 8 9 Christmas and New Year's -- Mr. Pipestem, any preference there? 10 No, Your Honor. I think we're --MR. PI PESTEM: 11 Mary Kathryn, do you have any thought on that? 12 Your Honor, do you mind if I defer to her? 13 THE COURT: Oh, of course. 14 MS. NAGLE: No. I think we're fine with that 15 schedule, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's just set -- and 17 any problem with that, Ms. McClanahan. 18 MS. MCCLANAHAN: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. We will set January 22nd, 20 which is a Friday, as a deadline for dispositive motions. 21 my thought is, because this is going to be tried to the court, 22 we will not set a trial date until we've ruled on dispositive 23 motions. The reason for that is non-jury trials are more 24 easily set; in other words, we can more flexibly set a trial 25 date for a nonjury trial and I'd like to get these summary

judgment motions resolved prior to going into a nonjury trial.

It's also my thought -- although we discussed the issue that we believe needed to be briefed before trial, it's my thought -- and I'll ask each of you, beginning with Ms. McClanahan, for your thoughts here -- but we outlined in the orders that we believed that briefing would be necessary with the issues of continuing trespass, ejectment, and res judicata. And because you all have agreed essentially to this schedule leading up to summary judgment motions, it would seem to us that we just see what issues are raised on summary judgment, and then to the extent that those issues are not addressed in the motions for summary judgment, then I would just direct you to file trial briefs with regard to those issues.

Any thoughts on that, Ms. McCl anahan?

MS. MCCLANAHAN: I think that does make sense. So instead of having some piecemeal briefing here early, you're just saying that everything would be included in that January date?

THE COURT: Well, I mean, to the extent -- you all, frankly, will know the case better than I and so you'll be informing me of your views as to the facts and the law in those summary judgment motions. And then to the extent that any of those issues have not been wrestled with in the cross-motions for summary judgment, then I would simply direct you to file

trial briefs on the issues that I believe I would need to be fully educated prior to the nonjury trial.

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MS. MCCLANAHAN: I think that makes perfect sense.

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THE COURT: Mr. Slade and Mr. Ray?

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MR. RAY: Your Honor, Ryan Ray here. I believe that

THE COURT: I think we'll cross that bridge when we

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makes sense as well. The one thing I would raise for

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report, I think, could be read that some, or maybe all of us,

discussion or to get the court's view is, the joint status

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contemplate multiple summary judgment motions. I'm at least

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aware, Your Honor, of the local rule of there only being one,

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and so would just respectfully request clarity from the court

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as to whether more than one motion for summary judgment is

get to it. I think discovery may well clarify facts and issues

for you. To the extent that you believe at the time, as we run

up on that January date, that more than one motion for summary

judgment needs to be filed by a party, then simply file that

motion seeking to file multiple motions for summary. It's a

rare occurrence when that happens, but we'll just judge it on

the merits as we approach that January day. How's that?

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contemplated by the court's directives in the order.

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sense.

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court has outlined proceeding makes perfect sense.

THE COURT: Ms. Nagle, Mr. Pipestem?

MR. RAY:

Brian P. Neil, RMR-CRR U.S. District Court - NDOK

Understood, Your Honor.

With that clarification, I believe that the manner the

Makes perfect

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MR. PIPESTEM: Your Honor, we have no objection to that. That makes sense to us.

THE COURT: Let me just ask Mr. Ray, because defendants had stated that they may wish to submit a motion for summary judgment regarding equitable defenses, including laches, that struck me as an interesting proposition. Because typically I've always thought that equitable defenses are not necessarily amenable to summary judgment given that they are a weighing of equities. Your thoughts?

And perhaps that may be, Your Honor. MR. RAY: depends on how facts develop in discovery. I think that's something that may, as we proceed, be pursued that way. It may be pursued, as the court says, by way of trial briefs as they devel op.

THE COURT: I don't want to prejudge it, but it would seem to me that that would make most sense, to address those equitable issues in a trial brief.

What else ought we address? Ms. McCl anahan?

MS. MCCLANAHAN: There are a couple things that come to mind, Your Honor. One thing that the parties are kind of at an impasse about also is the meaning of some language from your earlier orders, they were minute orders, docket 135 and docket 138. When you denied the United States' motion to strike Osage Wind's answer, you added this sentence: "Issues determined by the Tenth Circuit are law of the case and affirmative defenses

going to those issues shall not be considered on remand." And then docket 138, a sentence that reads: "The remaining issues in this case involve the relief due to the Osage Mineral Estate."

So kind of like the good faith/bad faith, this has given us some heartburn as we try and work our way through discovery issues. The defendants have asked for literally tens of thousands of pages of e-mails and communications about things like the United States or the Solicitor's Office or the local installation up in Pawhuska talking to the OMC about things as far back as 2010 and 2011, I assume, to try to shore up some kind of an equitable defense.

That has presented an incredible hardship for us so far as to trying just to get those documents processed, culled out, and things like that. We've objected to that discovery based on the language of docket 135 and to a lesser extent, I guess, the docket 138 language, understanding that affirmative defenses are not being -- or are not allowed at this point in the litigation and that we are moving to the relief due to the Osage Mineral Estate.

THE COURT: Well, frankly, Ms. McClanahan, you're hitting me cold here and I don't have No. 135 or No. 138 in front of me.

You know, as I pointed out with regard to the measure of damages for trespass, this innocent trespasser versus bad

faith trespasser issue, sometimes the court will use language in an order for one purpose without realizing that it may be read to foreclose legitimate discovery in connection with another.

So as I sit here right now, I can't advise you with regard to the meaning of 135 and 138 as it -- as it impacts discovery. I apologize but I don't think there's any way I can do that here just on the fly.

MS. MCCLANAHAN: I understand, Your Honor. And this may be something that just has to bubble up through Judge Jayne as a discovery dispute.

The only other issue that I thought might be addressed today was the statement in the joint status report where the parties are kind of struggling with how to approach a settlement. So my thoughts -- and they were only on the part of the United States -- was that, you know, it seems appropriate to appoint a settlement judge at this point. I don't know if a formal settlement conference where everyone is called in is even feasible, but it may not be advisable in this kind of a case either.

I was thinking, you know, someone like a John Tucker or somebody like that, who knows complex litigation very well, could start the ball rolling maybe by talking to sides on the phone or start looking at the procedural history before we make a decision about a formal conference.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection from anyone if I just start the ball rolling with regard to that? I know there have been some problems with some mediators. As you might suspect, we have some individuals in our adjunct settlement program who are unafraid of sitting down with both sides; others have said that they will not do so. I could make inquiry as to whether or not Mr. Tucker would be interested in talking to all sides by telephone.

Any objection to that, Mr. Ray?

MR. RAY: No, Your Honor. I think as we put in the status report, there's not ever been a settlement conference in this case and we're ready to have one or to engage in any level of discussions. I, frankly, participated in a mediation about a month ago in which every participant was in a different location and we did it on a remote platform.

So we're flexible, Your Honor, and would like to and think it is the appropriate time to have a settlement conference in this case or some kind of discussions.

THE COURT: Ms. Nagle, Mr. Pipestem, any thoughts?

MR. PIPESTEM: Your Honor, the Osage Minerals

Council would participate in that. We just worry that

discovery where it is the timing may not be right. We had this

discussion with counsel -- opposing counsel and we decided we'd

probably get down the line a little bit further before these

discussions could be fruitful but we would not oppose getting

the ball rolling.

THE COURT: Yeah. I fully understand that and you can simply convey that to Mr. Tucker or whoever else is appointed.

So that's a great idea, Ms. McClanahan. Anything else, Ms. McClanahan?

MS. MCCLANAHAN: Let me check with Mr. Fields. I don't think we have anything else on our punch list for today. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Ray, anything else on your punch list?

MR. RAY: Your Honor, just very briefly. I would just -- if the court is looking into this issue at all that Ms. McClanahan raised, I would just respectfully invite the court to footnote 3 in the joint status report. Our position is, Your Honor, if the Tenth Circuit determined the question, then certainly those issues are no longer in the case. But to say that there are no defenses of any kind that can be pursued, especially equitable defenses, we, Your Honor, would just respectfully submit that that is incorrect. So I just would like to add that clarification.

And with that, Your Honor, I don't believe that the defendants have anything else unless Mr. Slade or Ms. Stevenson has something to add that I'm not thinking of.

MR. SLADE: Your Honor, this is Lynn Slade. Nothing

further from me.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Ms. Nagle or Mr. Pipestem?

MS. NAGLE: Hi, this is Ms. Nagle. I'm not sure -- Wilson, are you going to be sharing anything?

MR. PIPESTEM: Well, I know we need to raise the issue of possibly filing an amended complaint. Maybe you can address that.

MS. NAGLE: Sure. So, Your Honor, you know, as you know, we filed our amended complaint and intervention pursuant to your July 1st order. But hearing what you had to say today during this conference, you know, specifically with regards to the fact that you did not intend to -- what I'm interpreting as a statement that you did not intend to preclude plaintiffs from making allegations or seeking discovery on claims that defendants' trespass was committed in bad faith or knowingly and intentionally, and certainly that is a claim that OMC feels that it has rightfully raised in this action.

I don't know if you've seen but there's sort of still a little bit of a remnant dispute in the joint status report between the amended complaint we did end up filing where the OMC did strike any reference to language such as "bad faith." We did keep language in the complaint referencing "knowingly and intentionally" and very much felt that was in line with the United States' first amended complaint; specifically, paragraph

49.

But, you know, I think just hearing what you had to say today, one concern I have for OMC is, you know, we don't want to lose our right to allege and seek remedies for a bad faith trespass. If we're all under the understanding that that's very much encompassed and included in the United States' first amended complaint and that's the operative complaint, then we're probably fine. But I'm wondering if the OMC needs to further amend its complaint to get that language with regards to the bad faith trespass back in there. Because we did take that out under a misunderstanding that that was what we needed to do to comply with Your Honor's July 1st order.

THE COURT: Well, my view -- this is Judge

Frizzell -- my view is that this issue is part and parcel of a trespass issue with regard to the mining or recovery of oil and gas in the state of Oklahoma.

These cases -- I've focused -- or I've read these
Oklahoma Supreme Court cases and they're really fascinating,
Dilworth and Edwards v. Lachman, L-a-c-h-m-a-n, and I think
it's just inherent that the measure of damages for trespass
when a party comes in and takes mineral interests. We haven't
even discussed another issue of whether the trespasser
conferred benefits upon the rightful owner of the oil and gas
rights which is another interesting twist.

One of the interesting issues here is whether that rule

is really intended to focus on oil and gas production. Because in that context, we can all understand how the production of oil and gas can actually benefit the rightful owner. But I think there's probably an issue here as to whether or not the mining of this limestone actually benefited the rightful owner of that mineral estate.

But the issue that's really before the court, or will be before the court, is whether or not the trespasser here is innocent or is not, or is a bad faith trespasser, and whether the trespasser is entitled to his mining costs. I think it's just part and parcel of a trespass claim in this context. So I don't think it's necessary to amend frankly.

And it's also interesting how the Oklahoma Supreme

Court has said that to deny the trespasser the offset of the mining cost is equivalent to punitive damages, which is something that you really don't see in other contexts.

So in short, I don't think you need amend. I think it's just all inherent in the issues that have already been framed in the first amended complaint.

MS. NAGLE: Thank you, Your Honor. That's very helpful.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pipestem, anything else?

MR. PIPESTEM: Yes, Your Honor. There's one other
issue we need to raise. As you're aware, the -- or I'm sure
you're aware -- the U.S. Supreme Court made a decision in

So the

1 McGirt related to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation reservation --2 THE COURT: What's that case? I've never heard of it. 3 4 MR. PI PESTEM: Well, you can Google that when it's 5 all over the place. So --6 THE COURT: I'm definitely kidding. 7 MR. PIPESTEM: I know you're kidding. 8 decision in *McGirt*, we have not fully analyzed whether that 9 case would have some direct bearing on this case. 10 THE COURT: Ri ght. 11 MR. PI PESTEM: So we don't have an answer for you on 12 whether that is definitely an issue that will need to be 13 raised, but we wanted to just identify it as one for the court 14 that could be important to this case. We have not gotten 15 direction yet from our client because of the newness of the 16 case. 17 But to the extent that the rationale of McGirt could 18 have a direct bearing on the *Irby* case and the authority of the 19 Osage Nation to exercise jurisdiction on a business who comes 20 onto the Osage reservation and enters into what would need to 21 be a consensual agreement with the Osage Nation through its 22 Minerals Council, we have not thought through all those 23 implications but we just wanted to identify it for the court as 24 an issue that we may want to raise at some point in the case. 25 THE COURT: Well, this is Judge Frizzell. I

anticipated that. But how do you get around *Irby* being a final decision of the Tenth Circuit? By the way, did you try to appeal *Irby* to the Supreme Court?

MR. PIPESTEM: Yeah. Cert was denied in *Irby*. I

MR. PIPESTEM: Yeah. Cert was denied in *Irby*. I was not counsel in that case but certainly was involved, you know, keeping an eye on it as counsel for the Osage Nation on another case at the same time. So, again, we have not thought through exactly the implications on the Osage Nation.

Certainly we've looked at the case and what the Tenth Circuit said and analyzed in *Solem v. Bartlett* and some of the other cases. And so, again, we don't have an answer to that at this point. But rather than raise it at a later point when the court was -- where we hadn't said anything about it to the other parties, we thought we would just identify it as an issue today.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Is there anything else that anyone would like to raise at this point? All right. Being none, thank you all very much and we are adjourned. Thank you.

(The proceedings were concluded)

CERTIFICATE1 2 3 4 I, Brian P. Neil, a Certified Court Reporter for the 5 Northern District of Oklahoma, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my 6 7 stenographic notes and is a true record of the proceedings held 8 in above-captioned case. 9 10 I further certify that I am not employed by or related 11 to any party to this action by blood or marriage and that I am 12 in no way interested in the outcome of this matter. 13 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 14 15 20th day of July 2020. 16 17 s/ Brian P. Neil 18 Brian P. Neil, RMR-CRR 19 Uni ted States Court Reporter 20 21 22 23 24 25